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BUCKLEY V. VALEO
CHALLENGING BUCKLEY V . VALEO: A LEGAL STRATEGY
by
John C. Bonifaz, Gregory G. Luke and Brenda Wright*

In its 1976 ruling in Buckley v. Valeo,1 the United States Supreme Court
sanctioned a system of unlimited campaign spending in federal elections. Since
that ruling, this nation has witnessed an explosion of political expenditures. The
1996 election cycle marked the most expensive election in U.S. history, with
congressional and presidential candidates spending a total of more than $2
billion.2 Campaign spending has also dramatically risen in state and local
elections across the country.3 Unlimited spending poses a serious threat to our
democratic process. It undermines public confidence in our elections and in our
democratic institutions.4 It presents an increased danger of actual corruption as
large contributors dominate the financing of public election campaigns.5 It
places enormous time pressures on officeholders running for re-election,
interfering with their ability to carry out their governing duties.6 It enables
candidates with wealth or access to wealth to drown out the voices of lesserfunded candidates and their supporters.7 It violates the promise of political
equality.8

*The writers are, respectively, the executive director, staff attorney and managing editor
for the National Voting Rights Institute.
1
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
2
See Ruth Marcus & Charles Babcock, The System Cracks Under Weight of Cash;
Candidates, Parties and Outside Interests Dropped a Record $2.7 Billion, THE
W ASHINGTON POST , February 9, 1997, at A1.
3
See Kevin Sack, High Stakes and Higher Antes in Statehouse Races, THE NEW YORK
TIMES, Sept. 6, 1998, at A24.
4
See Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to
Restoring the Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUM . L. REV. 1126, 1126-31 (1994)
[hereinafter Wertheimer & Manes].
5
See id. at 1131-42; see also Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the
Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 273, 293-97, 326-28 (1993) [hereinafter
Raskin & Bonifaz]; CHARLES LEWIS & THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, THE BUYING OF
THE CONGRESS (1998).
6
See Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why
Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 COLUM .
L. REV. 1281 (1994).
7
See infra text and accompanying notes 50-51.
8
Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 5, at 332..
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The time has come to revisit Buckley v. Valeo.9 The facts and
circumstances of unlimited campaign spending have dramatically changed since
the Buckley ruling. They now demonstrate the necessity for campaign spending
limits to protect the integrity of our electoral process. New facts now require a
new review. As the Supreme Court has stated:
In constitutional adjudication as
elsewhere
in
life,
changed
circumstances may impose new
obligations, and the thoughtful part of
the Nation could accept each decision to
overrule a prior case as a response to
the Court’s constitutional duty.10
This paper will highlight the emergence of a new legal movement for
challenging Buckley. It will present the arguments developed in several test
cases in jurisdictions that have sought to revisit the constitutionality of campaign
spending limits by enacting and defending mandatory spending limits.
These beginning efforts – from the cities of Cincinnati, Ohio and
Albuquerque, New Mexico, to the State of Vermont – have been launched with
the recognition that legal reform may be a long-term project. In 1937 and again
in 1951, the Supreme Court upheld the poll tax as constitutional.11 A fee
charged to voters in order to vote did not, the Court found, violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.12 In 1966, the Court reversed
its prior rulings. In the landmark case of Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,13
the Court held that “the Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political
theory of a particular era…Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change.”14
This article is presented in the spirit of Harper. Buckley may stand
today. But it cannot stand the test of time.

9

424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Planned Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992).
11
Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937); Butler v. Thompson, 341 U.S. 937 (1951)
(mem) (per curiam).
12
Id.
13
383 U.S. 663 (1966).
14
Harper, 383 U.S. at 669 (1966) (emphasis added).
10
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I. REVISITING BUCKLEY IN THE STATES

In the twenty-two years since Buckley, the ruling has generated
significant dissent within and outside of the legal community. More than 200
constitutional scholars from across the nation have signed a statement calling
for the reversal of Buckley’s prohibition on spending limits.15 The attorneys
general for 26 states and the secretaries of state or chief election officers for 21
states have gone on record seeking to overturn the ruling.16 Members of
Congress have introduced eleven bills since 1976 which would establish
campaign spending limits for federal elections and set the stage for revisiting
Buckley.17 Thirty-eight U.S. Senators have supported the call for the reversal of
the ruling. The White House and the U.S. Justice Department have also
announced their interest in supporting a test case for revisiting Buckley.18
Editorialists around the country have joined the call for a new look at the
constitutionality of spending limits.19
Sparking this growing support for revisiting Buckley are a series of state
and local initiatives to halt the spiraling influence of money in elections by
enacting and defending limits on campaign spending. The case that has
15

See Statement in Support of Overturning Buckley v. Valeo, January 28, 1998 (on file
with authors).
16
See Brief in Support of Petition for Certioriari of the States of Arizona, Connecticut,
Flordia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington and West
Virginia as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, City of Cincinnati v. Kruse, 142 F.3d
907 (6th Cir.1998 ); see David Stout, State Attorneys General Urge Limits on Campaign
Spending, THE NEW YORK TIMES, January 28, 1997, at A14 (noting that 24 state
attorneys general joined statement in support of City of Cincinnati’s spending limits
while case was pending before United States District Court). The Secretaries of State
or chief election officers of Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine,
Massachusetts, Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin joined the same statement.
17
See S. 1684, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. (1983); S. 1185, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. (1983); S.
59, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 2473, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 1456,
101st Cong. 1st Sess.; H. Res. 168, 103rd Cong. 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 3571, 103rd
Cong. 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 3651, 104th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1996); H.R. 3658, 104th
Cong. 2nd Sess. (1996); S. 1057, 105th Cong. 1st Sess. (1997); H.R. 77, 105th Cong. 1st
Sess. (1997).
18
See James Bennett, Clinton Pushes Spending Limits for Candidates, THE NEW YORK
TIMES, June 16, 1997, at B9.
19
See, e.g., Time to Rethink Buckley v. Valeo, THE NEW YORK TIMES, November 12,
1998 at A28; A Day in Court for Campaign Reform, THE BOSTON GLOBE, March 17,
1998 at A12.
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received the most attention is City of Cincinnati v. Kruse,20 the first test case in
twenty-two years to address directly the question of the constitutionality of
campaign spending limits. Although the Supreme Court recently declined,
without comment, to hear Cincinnati’s appeal of a lower court ruling enjoining
the limits, the case has had a significant impact in the support it has generated
for revisiting Buckley. It also generated a significant concurring opinion in the
Sixth Circuit which recognized, for the first time, that Buckley need not be read
as a per se ban on all spending limits and that state or local jurisdictions might
be able to justify such limits based on new compelling interests not addressed
by the Buckley Court in 1976. Examination of the Kruse case therefore
provides an important starting point for understanding the legal and factual
issues involved in the movement to revisit Buckley. Its lessons will have
continued application in future anticipated cases defending spending limits in
Vermont, New Mexico, and elsewhere.
A. Kruse v. City of Cincinnati
In July 1995, following twenty months of study and deliberation, the
Cincinnati City Council enacted limits on campaign expenditures in city council
elections. The city council set the limits at the level of three times the annual
salary for a city councilmember, a level of approximately $140,000. In enacting
these limits, the city council recognized the Supreme Court’s ruling in Buckley,
but found that new facts and circumstances associated with campaign spending
in its local elections demonstrated the necessity for spending limits. In March
1996, John R. Kruse, an unsuccessful city council candidate, his political
committee, and two financial contributors filed suit in federal district court in
Cincinnati, challenging the limits on Buckley grounds. The city retained the
National Voting Rights Institute as special counsel to defend the limits.
Throughout the litigation, the plaintiffs contended that Buckley stands
for the proposition that all campaign spending limits are per se unconstitutional.
The facts, the plaintiffs argued, do not matter. In so doing, the plaintiffs
stipulated at the summary judgment stage to any and all facts that the city
introduced into the record in its defense of the ordinance. This record included
the following facts:
• In the past several election cycles, the City of Cincinnati witnessed a
dramatic rise in the cost of Cincinnati city council campaigns. The
highest candidate expenditure for a winning campaign increased by
more than 480 percent, rising from $75,000 in 1989 to $362,000 in
1995.

20

142 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 511 (1998).
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• The rise in the overall cost of Cincinnati city council races has
caused a corresponding rise in the influence of wealthy donors in
Cincinnati’s elections. From 1991 to 1995, one-third of one percent of
the metropolitan area’s population provided more than $3.9 million in
campaign contributions to city council candidates, amounting to nearly
70% of all the money raised by those candidates.
• The public perception in Cincinnati, shared by an overwhelming
majority of Cincinnati residents, is that “large campaign contributors
wield undue influence on the political system.” That same overwhelming
majority state that “[t]he amount of money in election campaigns has
caused [them] to lose a great deal of faith in the political system.”
Cincinnati residents “firmly believe that their own and others’ level of
trust in the integrity of the political system has been eroded by the
amount of money in politics.”
• The rising costs of Cincinnati’s city council campaigns causes city
councilmembers to spend increasing amounts of time raising money for
the next election, which interferes with their responsibilities for governing
the city. This consequence of unlimited campaign spending further has
fueled the erosion of public confidence in Cincinnati in its local election
process and in its local government.
• The system of unlimited campaign spending in Cincinnati city council
elections has caused a “black-out” phenomenon with respect to
television advertising time. The policy of local television broadcasters in
Cincinnati is to sell television advertising spots on a first-come, firstserve basis. Because there is a limited supply of the most valuable
advertising spots available on local television, city council candidates
with significant quantities of campaign funds early in a campaign season
have been able to preempt effectively the right of other, less well-funded
candidates to purchase such advertising time.
• Candidates for Cincinnati city council can run a viable campaign
spending less than $140,000, the limit set by Cincinnati’s ordinance. Of
the nine winning Cincinnati city council candidates in the 1995 elections,
four won election spending less than $140,000, including one who spent
only $33,000 and a challenger candidate who spent $97,000.

Based on this record, the city argued that its limits were justified by the
compelling governmental interest in preventing corruption and the appearance
of corruption in the local election process, freeing its elected officials from the
pressures of fundraising so as to ensure that they are able to carry out their
representative duties without interference, and preventing some city council
candidates from blocking other candidates’ access to key television advertising
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time. In opposing the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the city further
argued that this factual record was sufficient, at a minimum, to demonstrate new
facts and circumstances warranting a trial at which the district court could
properly weigh the evidence showing the necessity of the limits.
In April 1998, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s January 1997 ruling granting the
plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and denying the city its opportunity to
prove its case at trial. A majority of the Sixth Circuit panel held that, under
Buckley, Cincinnati’s campaign spending limits were per se unconstitutional
regardless of what the record might show about the impact of unlimited
campaign spending.21 The panel further ruled that, were it to consider the
factual record, the City had not demonstrated that spending limits were
necessary to prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption in the
electoral process.22 The panel held that Cincinnati could not rely on the twentytwo years of federal election experience with contribution limits since Buckley to
demonstrate that such limits working alone are insufficient to assure the integrity
of the electoral process.23
The majority acknowledged that the time a
candidate must spend raising money for her campaign “detracts an officeholder
from doing her job,”24 but it nonetheless ruled that the interest in reducing the
time elected officials spend on fundraising “cannot serve as a basis for limiting
campaign spending.”25
U.S. District Judge Avern Cohn26 issued a concurring opinion. While
joining the majority’s affirmance of the District Court’s ruling, Judge Cohn
disagreed with the majority’s reading of Buckley with respect to campaign
spending limits:
The Supreme Court’s decision in
Buckley . . . is not a broad
pronouncement declaring all campaign
expenditure limits unconstitutional. It
may be possible to develop a factual
record to establish that the interest in
freeing officeholders from the pressures
of fundraising so they can perform their
duties, or the interest in preserving faith
21

Kruse, 142 F.3d at 915.
Id. at 916.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 917.
25
Id.
26
United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by
designation.
22
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in our democracy, is compelling, and
that campaign expenditure limits are a
narrowly tailored means of serving such
an interest.27

In September 1998, Cincinnati filed a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court. In its petition, the city argued that the Sixth Circuit ruling
conflicts with Buckley. In the alternative, the city argued that, if the Sixth Circuit
correctly read Buckley to hold that all campaign spending limits per se
unconstitutional, Buckley should now be overruled. Parts B and C, infra,
provide an overview of the city’s arguments that its campaign spending limits
ordinance was narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests and thus
consistent with the First Amendment.
B. The Compelling Governmental Interest in Preventing Corruption and the
Appearance of Corruption Justifies Campaign Spending Limits
In Buckley, the Supreme Court upheld congressional limits on campaign
contributions in federal elections as justified by the sufficiently important
governmental interests of preventing corruption and the appearance of
corruption.28 The Buckley Court specifically cited the dangers associated with
public perception of corruption, holding that
Congress could legitimately conclude
that the avoidance of the appearance of
improper influence “is also critical . . . if
confidence
in
the
system
of

27

Kruse, 142 F.3d at 920. While accepting the city’s argument that Buckley permits
proof of new facts and new compelling governmental interests that would justify
campaign spending limits, Judge Cohn voted to affirm the district court’s ruling, stating
that the factual record was insufficient to uphold Cincinnati’s limits. Judge Cohn did not
explain why he viewed the record as insufficient, and his ruling on this point appears
inconsistent with the standards governing review of a grant of summary judgment. On a
motion for summary judgment, a court may not weigh conflicting evidence; summary
judgment is properly granted only “when there exists no genuine issues of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (emphasis added). Cincinnati presented facts
going directly to Judge Cohn’s points concerning “the interest in freeing officeholders
from the pressures of fundraising” and “the interest in preserving faith in our
democracy.” Having made this showing of genuine factual issues, the city should have
been granted the opportunity to go to trial to prove its case, and Judge Cohn’s
concurrence more logically should have been a dissent.
28
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-38.
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representative Government is not to be
eroded to a disastrous extent.”29
The Court nevertheless rejected the necessity of expenditure limits,
expressing its faith , based on the record before it, that the contribution limits
alone would be sufficient to address such governmental interests. While the
appellate court had ruled that “the expenditure restrictions are necessary to
reduce the incentive to circumvent direct contribution limits,”30 the Supreme
Court found:
There is no indication [in the record] that the
substantial criminal penalties for violating the
contribution ceilings combined with the political
repercussion of such violations will be
insufficient
to
police
the
contribution
provisions.31
This pivotal passage from Buckley unambiguously reveals that a key
empirical judgment -- drawn from the record -- ultimately determined the
constitutionality of the congressional campaign spending limits. For what if the
record in Buckley had established that the “substantial criminal penalties” and
the “political repercussion” were not sufficient to “police the contribution
provisions?” Clearly, Buckley leaves the door open for a different factual record
which would justify the need for campaign spending limits. The argument that
campaign spending limits are a necessary concomitant to contribution limits was
rejected by the Buckley Court only as a matter of fact.
The Cincinnati record presented new facts and circumstances
demonstrating the necessity for campaign spending limits to address the city’s
interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption in the
electoral process. John Deardourff, a public opinion researcher with more than
30 years of experience, documented a pervasive public perception of corruption
in Cincinnati with respect to the city council election process. The city
demonstrated, through Mr. Deardourff’s affidavit, that this crisis in public
confidence in Cincinnati with respect to the political system is directly tied to
unlimited campaign spending. Cincinnati residents “firmly believe that their own
and others’ level of trust in the integrity of the political system has been eroded
by the amount of money in politics.”32 An overwhelming majority of Cincinnati
residents agreed with the statement, “The amount of money in election

29

Id. at 27, citing CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973).
Buckley, 519 F.2d 817, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
31
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 56.
32
R. No.38, Deardourff Affidavit at 9.
30
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campaigns has caused me to lose a great deal of faith in the political system.”33
The record in Cincinnati thus demonstrated that public confidence in the
system of representative government in Cincinnati has been “eroded to a
disastrous extent,” and that contribution limits alone were insufficient to address
this public perception of corruption.
The city also presented crucial expert testimony that “the rise in the
overall cost of city council races has caused a rise in the influence of wealthy
donors in the City’s elections, with such donors increasingly dominating the
campaign fundraising process.” From 1991 to 1995, one-third of one percent
of the metropolitan area’s population provided more than $3.9 million in
campaign contributions to city council candidates, amounting to nearly 70% of
all the money raised by those candidates. The Buckley Court did not hear this
type of critical evidence linking unlimited campaign spending with a
corresponding rise in the influence of wealthy donors in elections.
Like Cincinnati, the nation as a whole has witnessed the harmful impact
of unlimited campaign spending in elections, despite the existence of
contribution limits for federal elections. In the twenty-two years since Buckley,
the federal election experience has demonstrated that contribution limits will not,
alone, sufficiently address corruption and the appearance of corruption in the
electoral process.
Recent public opinion polls confirm that citizens on all sides of the
political spectrum perceive both actual and potential corruption in government
under the current system of unlimited campaign spending. Notably, in a 1996
poll taken directly after the November elections, Americans ranked the "power of
special interest groups in politics" second only to "international terrorists" when
asked to identify "major threats" to the future of the country.34 The same poll
revealed that the percent of people who feel the country is "losing ground" in its
effort to fight political corruption has grown steadily over recent years.35
33

Id. at 10.

34

Public opinion survey conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates on behalf
of the Pew Research Center in conjunction with PBS series, The State of the Union
(November 1996) <http://www.people-press.org/unionrpt.htm>.
35
The steady erosion of confidence in government is documented by numerous other
polls: See THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1994, at 219 (1994) (finding that 49% of
the public believe Congress is more corrupt than in 1974); Ronald G. Shafer,
Washington Wire: Fundraising Flaps Roil the Administration Even as Clinton Backs
Overhaul, W ALL ST . J. , Jan. 31 1997, at A1 (citing survey results showing 68% of
Americans believe politics more influenced by special interests today than twenty
years ago); see also JOHN R. HIBBING & E LIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, CONGRESS AS PUBLIC
ENEMY: PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS , 6-7, 31-39
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In a 1997 survey of the public's views on the impact of money in politics,
sixty-six percent of respondents deemed the excessive influence of political
contributions on elections and government policy a "major problem". Sixty-five
percent identified as another "major problem" the conflict of interest that occurs
when politicians make decisions about issues of concern to those who fund their
campaigns while seventy-one percent cited the good people being discouraged
from running for office by the high cost of campaigns.36
In a February 1997 Gallup poll for CNN-USA Today, fifty-three percent of
voters said that "campaign contributions influence the policies supported by
elected officials" a "great deal".37 Two months later, a separate poll determined
that seventy-five percent of Americans believe that "public officials make or
change policy decisions as a result of money they receive from major
contributors."38
More recently, in an August 1998 poll of voters in eight states,
overwhelming majorities decried actual corruption and expressed desire for
systemic reform. 39 A sea change in attitudes has occurred, moreover, as voters
now clearly perceive that their own senators are not immune from the corrupting
influence of special interest contributions. (Formerly, voters would decry
corruption in Congress but disavow the suspicion that their own senators were
guilty of ethical lapses.) Between sixty-five and seventy-five percent of voters
now believe that campaign contributions affect the votes of their own senators
on issues of concern to special interests.
Polling data uniformly demonstrates that the current campaign finance
regime has devastated public confidence in government.40 Contrary to the
(1995).
36
Public Opinion poll conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates on behalf of
the Center for Responsive Politics, Money and Politics: A National Survey of the
Public's View on How Money Impacts our Political System, (Center for Responsive
Politics, 1997).
37
Public opinion poll commissioned by CNN/USA Today and performed by Gallup
(February 1997) (reprinted in Pacs, Parties, and Potato Chips: Myths and
Misconceptions About Reforming the Campaign Finance System (Public Campaign
1998)). An additional 33% said contributions influenced officials a "moderate amount."
38
Francis X. Clines, Most Doubt a Resolve to Change Campaign Finance Reform, Poll
Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1997, at A1; see also HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note
35, at 63-64 (indicating that 86% of the population believes that the government is
controlled by special interests).
39
Public opinion poll commissioned by Public Campaign and conducted by The
Mellman Group, Inc. (August 1998) <http://www.publicampaign.org/poll9_3_98.html>.
40
See generally David Schultz, Revisiting Buckley v. Valeo: Eviscerating the Line
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Court's assurance that "substantial criminal penalties for violating the
contribution ceilings" would suffice to "alleviat[e] the corrupting influence of large
contributions,"41 the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness
of the opportunities for abuse inherent in the present regime grows apace. A
danger the Court identified as a justification for drastic remedial action has
obtained: "confidence in the system of representative government" has
undeniably been "eroded to a disastrous extent."42
The public’s view of the current system, moreover, is not based on
imaginary fears.43 The federal experience teaches that the ingenuity of those
who wish to purchase influence in government cannot be squelched by
contribution limits alone. Large aggregations of wealth still pour into campaign
coffers under practices generally known as bundling.44 When individuals
representing the same corporation, industry or special interest send
contributions to a candidate at roughly the same time, they have circumvented
the intent of existing contribution limits by bundling together far greater amounts
than the law allows. Candidates recognize the actual, unified source of this
aggregated largesse and are thus subject to the same "corrupting influence of
large contributions" that the Supreme Court reviled.
Typically, a corporation will identify particular candidates and instruct its
top brass and employees about where and when to send contributions. Such
organized bundling is difficult to monitor because "bundlers" are not required to
identify their participation in aggregated donations. By organizing bundles,
institutionally related donors evade the important disclosure requirements that
apply to PAC's, thereby denying the public critical information regarding
attempts by special interest groups to affect public policy.

Betweeen Candidate Contributions and Independent Expenditures, 19 J. L. & P OL. 33,
93-00 (1998).
41
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 55-56.
42
Id. at 27 (quoting United States Civil Serv. Comm'n. v. National Ass'n. of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)).
43
Even officeholders, in their more candid moments, will confirm the stranglehold that
money exerts on the political process. See Marcus & Babcock; One Day on the Fundraising Trail: Dawn to Dark/Chasing the Dollars, THE BOSTON GLOBE, May 16, 1997, at
A1, quoting U.S. Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia in a March 1997 Senate floor
speech: “The incessant money chase that permeates every crevice of our political
system is like an unending circular marathon. And it is a race that sends a clear
message to the people: that it is money, money, money that reigns supreme in
American politics.” Id.
44
See, e.g., Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 4, at 1140-42 (1994); Raskin & Bonifaz,
supra note.5, at 326-27 (citing LARRY MAKINSON, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS ,
OPEN SECRETS: THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONGRESSIONAL MONEY & P OLITICS (2d ed. 1992).
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A notable example is MBNA, a Delaware banking and credit card
corporation that ranked as the most profligate bundler of individual contributions
in the 1994 election cycle and continues to organize substantial bundled
donations today.
MBNA organized over $868,000 worth of bundled
contributions to federal candidates in 1994, with the lion's share, roughly
$500,000, going to four senators.45 Under existing contribution limits, an MBNA
PAC would have only been able to donate a total of $30,000 to these four
candidates ($5,000 per candidate per primary/election), as only three were
contesting a seat. (Alfonse D'Amato was not running for election at the time, but
became the Chair of the Senate Banking Committee as a result of the
Republican shift in 1994.) Through bundling, however, MBNA was able to
amplify its message of corporate support by a factor of fifteen.
Sixteen of the top fifty bundlers of contributions to federal candidates in
the 1996 election cycle were securities and investment firms. Collectively, the
contributions doled out by the employees, officers and/or family members
connected with these firms totaled over $4,420,000. As a sector, the financial
industry remains a dominant source of funding for federal candidates, especially
through the evasive technique of bundling.
The authors have received anecdotal accounts of the techniques
corporations use to encourage their employees to contribute to the company
PAC fund or directly to identified candidates. These techniques include
bonuses that reimburse the employee for the contribution or other incentives
such as promises to match contributions to the employee's charity of choice.
Strong evidence of these kinds of illegal, de facto contributions by corporations
can only come from insiders who risk their careers by whistleblowing.
Conduits are another method of aggregating individual contributions.
Individuals, groups, or PAC's who collect and deliver contributions as conduits
can take credit for (and exert influence by) amassing far more money than the
law would allow them to give directly. The Technet PAC collected and delivered
to lawmakers at least $180,000 in the 1997-98 elections. An example of their
beneficiaries is Sen. Spencer Abraham (R-Mich.), sponsor of Technet backed
legislation, for whom $19,500 was collected.
Candidates also effectively solicit bundled contributions by establishing
"Leadership PACs" -- alter-ego campaign committees that allow donors to
double the size of their contributions. Though Leadership PACs may not spend
money directly on the sponsoring politician's campaign, they may cover
"overhead" and the cost of related political activities (like pollsters and
consultants) that contribute indirectly to the sponsor's success. Leadership
45

All information regarding MBNA bundling available from the The Big Picture: Center
for Responsive Politics (1998) <http://www.crp.org/pubs/bigpicture>.
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PACs also collect funds that the sponsor may pass on to support the campaigns
of political allies.
The Sixth Circuit majority opinion in Kruse asserted that"[t]he problems
uncovered on the federal level are explained primarily by the 'soft-money'
loophole in contribution restrictions and do not undermine the Supreme Court's
conclusion that spending restrictions are not narrowly tailored to addressing the
problem of the corrupting nature of money in politics."46 There was, however,
no record evidence supporting the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that the “softmoney” loophole is the only, or even the primary, source of the system’s current
problems. While soft money contributions have indeed exploded over the last
decade, soft money accounted for only eleven percent of the total amount of
money spent in the 1996 federal elections.47 Accordingly, the courts cannot in
good faith conclude that the corrupting failures of the present system are
attributable to soft money alone and thereby ignore the corrosive effects of
bundled contributions.
C. New Compelling Governmental Interests Justify Campaign Spending Limits.
The Court in Buckley did not hold that there could never be a new and
compelling governmental interest that would justify campaign spending limits.
Rather, the Court stated: “No governmental interest that has been suggested is
sufficient to justify [the congressional campaign spending limits].”48 The
implication is clear. The door remains open to compelling governmental
interests that were not suggested to the Buckley Court. This Court reaffirmed
that point in NC-PAC, stating that “preventing corruption or the appearance of
corruption are the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far
identified for restricting campaign finances.”49
Cincinnati presented two new and compelling governmental interests
that justified its campaign spending limits. First, the city has an interest in
freeing its elected officials from the pressures of fundraising to ensure that they
are able to carry out their representative duties without interference.
The increasing amount of time elected officials spend raising money for
their campaigns has fueled the erosion of public confidence in the democratic
process in Cincinnati. As the city’s Campaign Finance Advisory Board found in
its final report to the Cincinnati city council, the time candidates spend raising
46

City of Cincinnati v. Kruse, 142 F.3d 907, 916 (6th Cir. 1998).
See The Big Picture: Money Follows Power Shift on Capitol Hill (Center for
Responsive Politics 1997).
48
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 55 (1976) (emphasis added).
49
FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, 470 U.S. 480, 496-97
(1985) (emphasis added).
47
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money is directly tied to the rising costs of city council campaigns. Instead of
focusing on their responsibilities for governing the city, councilmembers must
spend their time chasing the funds they need to compete in an unlimited “arms
race” of campaign spending.50 A regime of unlimited campaign spending has
had the same detrimental effect on officeholders’ attention to their duties at the
federal level.51 The Buckley Court never addressed whether the compelling
iterest in preserving officeholders’ time for carrying out their official duties would
justify campaign spending limits, and Buckley therefore cannot be read as
foreclosing reliance on this interest to support reasonable restrictions on
campaign spending.
Cincinnati also presented a new and compelling governmental interest in
preventing some city council candidates from blocking other candidates’ access
to key television advertising time. In Cincinnati, city council candidates with
large sums of money early in the election season are able effectively to shut out
other candidates from broadcasting their messages on prime time television in
the critical weeks leading to election day -- a “black-out” phenomenon. The
Buckley record did not include this crucial evidence.
As explained in the expert testimony of an advertising executive with 28
years of experience in the creation and production of television advertisements
50

See R. No. 38, Advisory Board Report at 4; R.No.38, Smith Affidavit at 4: “[T]he high
costs of City Council campaigns today causes our City Councilmembers to spend too
much time raising money for the next election, rather than focusing on their
responsibilities on governing the city;” R.No.38, League of Women Voters Report,1:
“More time than is reasonable is spent raising money for campaigns, which may
interfere with time for governing”; Blasi, supra note 6, at 1283: “Legislators and
aspirants for legislative office who devote themselves to raising money round-the-clock
are not in essence representatives.”
51
Blasi, supra note 6, at 1281: “Candidates for office spend too much time raising
money. This is scarcely a controversial proposition.” Id. (citing sources on the
burdens of fundraising in federal elections). See also MARTIN SCHRAM, SPEEKING
FREELY: F ORMER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS TALK ABOUT MONEY IN POLITICS 37-46 (1995)
(former Members of Congress discuss the enormous pressures of fundraising and its
drain on their time for performing their official duties); DAN CLAWSON ET AL., MONEY
TALKS: CORPORATE PACS AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE 7-8 (1992): “The quest for money is
never ending . . . . To pay for an average winning campaign, representatives need to
raise $3,700 and senators $12,000 during every week of their term of office.” Id.; PHILIP
M. STERN, STILL THE BEST CONGRESS MONEY CAN BUY 119 (1992)(quoting former
Congressman Bob Edgar, a Pennsylvania Democrat who resigned from the House to
avoid another campaign fundraising cycle: “Eighty percent of my time, 80 percent of my
staff’s time, 80 percent of my events and meetings were fundraisers. Rather than go to
a senior center, I would go to a party where I could raise $3,000 or $4,000.”); 138 Cong.
Rec. S115 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1987)
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for Cincinnati city council candidates, well-funded candidates engage in media
campaigns which “have the effect of preempting the right of other less wellfunded candidates from purchasing the most valuable advertising spots.”52
Well-funded candidates in Cincinnati make excessive television advertising
purchases at an early point in the campaign so that prime-time advertising is
unavailable by the time other candidates have raised sufficient funds to
purchase such ads. The City’s campaign spending limits provided a means to
break up this “effective monopoly on the most valuable advertising time.”53
Under the reasonable spending limits adopted by Cincinnati, candidates would
still be able to purchase substantial television advertising time, but would not be
able to freeze out similar purchases by other candidates.
The Buckley Court did not discuss whether government may act to
regulate spending that is strategically designed to lessen the amount of
information available to voters. State and local governments should be free to
protect all candidates’ access to the marketplace of ideas by preventing the
monopolization of important means of communication. Indeed, in the related
First Amendment area of television broadcasting, the Supreme Court recently
reaffirmed the governmental interest in promoting the widespread dissemination
of information from a multiplicity of sources. In Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. FCC,54 the Court upheld the “must carry” provisions of the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, declaring that
“Congress has an independent interest in preserving a multiplicity of
broadcasters to ensure that all households have access to information and
entertainment on an equal footing with those who subscribe to cable.” State
and local governments surely have at least an equally important interest in
preserving candidates’ access to a key medium of communication to the voters
during a crucial period in the election campaign.55
While the Sixth Circuit’s majority opinion in Kruse rejected the possibility
that spending limits could ever be justified by new compelling interests not
directly addressed in Buckley, Judge Cohn’s concurring opinion agreed with the
city’s contention that Buckley did not foreclose that possibility. Judge Cohn
wrote:
The Supreme
Buckley . .

Court’s decision in
.is not a broad

52

Kruse, R. No. 38, Affidavit of Jerry Galvin at 4.
Id. at 5.
54
117 S.Ct. 1174, 1189 (1997).
55
Cincinnati, of course, would not have had the power to address the “blackout”
phenomenon by imposing “fairness” requirements directly on the television stations,
given the Federal Communication Commission’s jurisdiction over regulation of
broadcast media.
53
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pronouncement declaring all campaign
expenditure limits unconstitutional. It
may be possible to develop a factual
record to establish that the interest in
freeing officeholders from the pressures
of fundraising so they can perform their
duties, or the interest in preserving faith
in our democracy, is compelling, and
that campaign expenditure limits are a
narrowly tailored means of serving such
an interest.56
As the first judicial recognition that Buckley does not forever foreclose
the possibility of placing reasonable limits on campaign spending, Judge Cohn’s
concurrence represents a substantial development in the legal movement to
revisit the question of spending limits.
D. Avenues for Further Development of Challenges to Buckley
The Supreme Court, by denying Cincinnati’s petition for certiorari in
November 1998, passed on its first opportunity since Buckley to revisit the issue
of spending limits. The denial of certiorari in the first case to present the issue,
however, does not necessarily signal that the door is forever barred, as a
number of Supreme Court observers pointed out.57 The Court generally moves
slowly in revisiting its prior decisions, even those that have received sustained
criticism over time. Reformers must be prepared to sustain a long-term effort to
develop favorable cases and to pursue any necessary appeals, so that the
Supreme Court will have further opportunities to review the question of spending
limits.
To maximize the chances of successfully defending spending limits,
jurisdictions adopting such limits should pay careful attention to developing the
factual record demonstrating why the limits are both reasonable and necessary.
It is particularly important that the limits be set at a level that clearly permits
candidates to communicate effectively with the electorate and to run viable
campaigns, taking into account the costs of media, direct mail, and other
campaign costs in the jurisdiction. In Cincinnati, the limit of $140,000 was
deemed by the district court to be more than sufficient to run a viable campaign,
thus obviating one of the most important potential barriers to the defense of
56

Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 920 (6th Cir. 1998).
See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Reject Appeals in Two Cases Involving Limits on
Political Money, THE NEW YORK TIMES, November 17, 1998 at A11; Edward Felsenthal,
High Court Demurs on Campaign Funds, W ALL STREET JOURNAL, November 17, 1998
at B11.
57
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spending limits. While such a finding will not, as Kruse demonstrates,
necessarily assure final victory in the courts, an unreasonably low limit will
almost certainly lead to quick defeat.
The defense of spending limits also requires careful attention to
demonstrating that lesser measures, such as contribution limits alone, have
been or are likely to be insufficient to curb corruption and the appearance of
corruption. If a jurisdiction has had contribution limits in place for a number of
years, public opinion polls showing continued pervasive concern about the
influence of money on their elected officials will be extremely useful, and
perhaps indispensable, in documenting the necessity for more effective
measures. Specific instances of influence-peddling or evasions of contribution
limits, if available, provide additional factual support for spending limits. Careful
documentation of the need to preserve officeholders’ time from the pressures of
fundraising is important, especially in light of Judge Cohn’s concurring opinion in
Kruse finding this interest to be new and compelling. The testimony of
candidates, political consultants, and other actors familiar with electoral politics
in the jurisdiction is also valuable in documenting why expenditure limits are
necessary. Demonstrating that dramatic growth in campaign spending has
been accompanied by growing numbers of elections in which no one comes
forward to challenge the well-financed incumbent further illustrates the
antidemocratic effect of unlimited spending, supporting the need for reform.
The stage is already set for additional test cases that will give the courts
the opportunity to revisit the question of spending limits. In 1997, the State of
Vermont enacted campaign spending limits for its state elections to take effect in
the 2000 election cycle, along with a comprehensive system of voluntary public
funding for candidates running for governor and lieutenant governor.58
Vermont’s action is significant, because it means that a state legislature has now
placed its weight behind the necessity of spending limits to curb the corrupting
influence of money and to assure that elected officials will devote their time to
governing rather than fundraising. The proponents of Vermont’s new law plan
to mount an aggressive defense to an expected constitutional challenge to be
filed after the law goes into effect in November 1998.
Since 1974, the City of Albuquerque has maintained limits on campaign
expenditures for its local elections, making it the only major city in the country
with sustained experience with campaign spending limits in operation.59 Last
year, a mayoral candidate and three campaign contributors filed suit in state
court seeking to strike down the limits on Buckley grounds and obtained a
preliminary injunction preventing the enforcement of the limits in the October

58
59

VT . STAT . ANN. 17 § 2805a (effective November 4, 1998).
Albuquerque, N.M. Charter, art. XIII, § 4.
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1997 municipal elections.60 The city, recognizing the emerging movement for
revisiting Buckley, retained the National Voting Rights Institute to defend its
limits. In August 1998, the plaintiffs withdrew their complaint, with the
unsuccessful mayoral candidate citing his lack of interest in running for local
office again. With the limits back in place, the city, with the Institute, is preparing
to defend against an anticipated new lawsuit. Albuquerque’s unique posture as
the only major city with 20 years’ actual experience with spending limits makes it
a particularly valuable test case for revisiting Buckley. Albuquerque’s record
shows that spending limits have encouraged electoral competition in city
elections, with numerous instances of challengers mounting successful
campaigns against incumbents.61
In July 1995, the Supreme Court of Ohio revised its judicial code of
ethics to set campaign spending limits for that state’s judicial elections.62 A
group of judicial candidates promptly challenged the limits in federal court as
violative of the First Amendment, relying on Buckley. The Ohio Attorney
General’s Office defended the limits as justified by a new compelling
governmental interest in protecting the impartiality of the state judiciary, an
interest not presented to, and therefore not addressed by, the Buckley Court.
Twenty-two states joined an amicus brief in support of the limits at the appellate
court level. The brief, co-authored by the Iowa Attorney General’s Office and
the Institute, argued that judicial elections are distinguishable from legislative
elections, and, in the alternative, that if Buckley is to be applied, the ruling
should be reconsidered in light of new facts and circumstances.
A three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit recently affirmed a district court judgment invalidating the judicial
campaign spending limits, rejecting the argument that restrictions on judicial
elections should be judged by different and more lenient standards than those
applicable to elections for legislative and executive office.63 The Sixth Circuit’s
ruling, unfortunately, also placed the case in an awkward posture for review by
the United States Supreme Court, because the Sixth Circuit’s substantive ruling
addressed a set of limits that had been revised by the Ohio Supreme Court
during the course of the litigation and were no longer in effect. The Sixth Circuit
did not rule upon the constitutionality of Ohio’s revised spending limits, leaving
that issue to be determined by the district court on remand. The Ohio Attorney
General, on behalf of the state supreme court, filed an unsuccessful petition for
60

Murphy v. City of Albuquerque, No. CV-97-7826 (Second Judicial District of New
Mexico).
61
See Dana Milbank, Renewed Battle Brewing on Campaign Spending Caps, THE
W ALL STREET JOURNAL, March 24, 1998, at A24; Robert Zausner, Campaign spending
limit? In Albuquerque, It’s Old Hat, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, October 23, 1998, at A21.
62
Supreme Court of Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon VII(C)(6).
63
Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 890 (1999).
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certiorari before the Supreme Court. The constitutionality of the new limits,
accordingly, is subject to further litigation in the district court and court of
appeals. If the new limits are again struck down by the lower courts, as
anticipated, the stage will be set for a second effort to obtain Supreme Court
review, this time without the distraction of a procedural bar to consideration of
the merits.
II. REVISITING THE REJECTED BUCKLEY GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS
In addition to the new interests presented in Kruse, the Court should
reconsider certain justifications for campaign spending limits that it summarily
dismissed in Buckley. Primary among these is the claim that spending limits are
necessary to achieve the political equality that is essential to a just democracy
and guaranteed to all citizens under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Without some guarantee of equal political opportunity,
wealth has and will continue to debase our democracy. Another argument
deserving reconsideration is the notion that campaign spending should be
viewed as communicative conduct and not as ‘pure’ speech. When the Court
mistook money for speech in Buckley, it applied too strict a standard to marginal
abridgements of a purported ‘right to spend’ and mistakenly conferred upon
campaign war chests the absolute protection of the First Amendment. Instead,
the Court should have analyzed spending limits according to the line of cases
that allow partial abridgement of First Amendment rights in the form of time,
place and manner restrictions, or alternatively, as necessary regulation of a
scarce communicative resource. In this last vein, advocates should also
encourage the Court to bring careful scrutiny to the “free market of ideas.”
Detailed attention to the actual business of campaigns will inform a more
nuanced understanding of the real market for electoral speech. Competition in
this marketplace could then be fruitfully analyzed—and protected—under
established principles of antitrust law.
A. Political Equality
Scholars have criticized many aspects of the Court’s muddled analytical
framework in Buckley. Yet, few phrases in that decision have subdued
subsequent prudential and legislative debate more than the Court’s famous
dictum that “the concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment”.64 A survey of American political philosophy
and legal precedent reveal that this claim is overblown, if not, as one scholar
observed, “demonstrably incorrect”.65 While the Buckley Court chose summarily
64

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM .
L. REV. 1369, 1383 (1994).
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to subordinate political equality to the First Amendment, many scholars, jurists,
and philosophers see political equality as “the cornerstone of American
democracy”.66
Even at a time when the franchise was denied to many citizens,
American constitutional thought recognized “establishing a political equality
among all” as the primary remedy to political evils.67 As James Madison
famously noted:
Who are to be the electors of the
Fœderal Representatives? Not the rich
more than the poor; not the learned
more than the ignorant; not the haughty
heirs of distinguished names, more than
the humble sons of obscure and
unpropitious fortune. The electors are
to be the great body of the people . . . 68
Modern philosophers place an even higher value on political equality.
John Rawls, for instance, recognizes that the “fair opportunity to take part in and
to influence the political process” is not merely an aspiration of a just
constitutional democracy, but rather a precondition. Noting that “[t]he liberties
protected by the principle of participation lose much of their value whenever
those who have greater private means are permitted to use their advantages to
control the course of public debate,” Rawls argues that universal suffrage alone
is inadequate to preserve a just system when “the political forum is so
constrained by the wishes of the dominant interests that the basic measures
needed to establish just constitutional rule are seldom properly presented.”69 A
failure to compensate for the disproportionate effects of wealth in politics thus
undermines the value of voting.70

66

J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an
Obstacle to Political Equality? 82 COLUM . L. REV. 609, 625 (1982); see also A.
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 10-11 (1948); J.
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-19, 205-07, 221-28 (1971); Scanlon, A Theory of
Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB . AFF. 204, 214 (1972); A. DE TOQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 59, 474 (J.P. Mayer & M. Lerner eds., G Lawrence trans.
1966).
67
JAMES MADISON, 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 197 (Robert A. Rutland et al.
Eds., 1983); see also FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 305 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke, ed. 1961).
68
FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 385 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke, ed. 1961).
69
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE , 221-228 (1971).
70
Rawls' conclusion is particularly chilling when compared to the Court's own
observation that "[o]ther rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is
undermined." Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
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The First Amendment cannot protect speech rights to the exclusion of all
other values. In numerous contexts, the Court has upheld restrictions on the
speech of some elements of society in order to protect other communal
interests.71 The Buckley Court’s “ritual incantation of the notion of absolute
protection” for the quantity as well as the content of political expression cannot
be squared with political reality, nor is it supported in theory. Rawls effectively
dismisses the Court’s First Amendment absolutism by noting that “basic liberties
constitute a family, and that it is this family that has priority and not any single
liberty itself”. “[P]olitical speech,” he concludes, “even though it falls under the
basic liberty of freedom of thought, must be regulated to insure the fair value of
political liberties.”72 Alexander Meiklejohn recognizes that some regulation of
political speech in the name of political equality is necessary for the orderly
presentation and intelligent deliberation self-government requires.73 Similarly,
Ronald Dworkin deems the Buckley dictum rejecting the interest in political
equality a “mistake because the most fundamental characterization of
democracy—that it provides self-government by the people as a whole—
supposes that citizens are equals not only as judges but as participants as
well.”74 Dworkin urges that Buckley be overruled because its “rigid rule is not
just an inconvenience but a serious loss in the quality of the very democracy”
that rule supposedly protects.75 Thus, even as a matter of pure theory,
preservation of the conditions under which free speech may take place cannot
be wholly foreign to the First Amendment.
This notion is not merely an academic exercise, but has found
expression in the courts as well. In his dissent in Bellotti, Justice White argued
that some level of political equalization is in fact required by the First
Amendment: “The Court’s fundamental error is its failure to realize that the state
regulatory interests in terms of which the alleged curtailment of First Amendment
rights . . . must be evaluated are themselves derived from the First
Amendment.”76 In the Bellotti context -- the attempted limitation of corporate
spending on ballot initiatives that had no direct effect on the corporation’s
business -- the value of promoting free political debate required the prevention
of corporate domination. Justice White recognized that the issue is not whether
71

See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559
(1965); City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984);
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781 (1989); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
72
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 356-63 (1993).
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MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 66, at 23.
74
Ronald Dworkin, The Curse of American Politics, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS,
Oct. 16, 1996, at 19, 23.
75
Id. at 22.
76
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 803-04 (1978).
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First Amendment rights may be abridged at all but instead whether the state has
chosen “the best possible balance” between “competing First Amendment
interests.”77
Indeed, it is crucial to remember that marginal regulation of campaign
contributions and expenditures does not effect real political equality. In the
context of contribution limits, one thousand dollars still represents a substantial
sum of money. Most working persons simply do not have sufficient disposable
income to contribute anywhere near the limit, even if they feel tremendous
passion about the candidates in question. Accordingly, contribution limits
marginally encourage, but do not guarantee, real equality of input in the political
system. Similarly, raising the floor through public election financing or capping
the ceiling through spending limits will not equalize the output of all political
voices. At best, such a regime would prevent certain candidates from
monopolizing communications media while giving less wealthy candidates a
basic, meaningful opportunity to campaign before the general public.
Creating a ceiling on expenditures does not raise the floor for those
whose economic status precludes even the most basic forms of mass political
communication. A reform law that employs both spending limits and public
financing would more comprehensively serve the interest of political equality. In
Vermont, the new spending and public financing regime that is set to take effect
in the year 2000 will, once challenged, offer just such a test case for the courts,
allowing advocates to set forth arguments regarding the factual circumstances
and civic interests that justify comprehensive campaign spending limitations.
The Vermont legislature specifically found that mandatory spending limits were
necessary to protect the viability of the public funding program they had also
devised. In contrast, some jurisdictions that provide for elective public funding
allow candidates to abandon or supplement the public funding program when an
opposition candidate spends beyond certain limits. Such opt-out provisions, of
course, may undermine the purpose of public funding statutes by leaving them
vulnerable to any non-participants who elect to instigate an escalating spending
contest. Vermont, by contrast, opted to pre-empt war chest competition (and its
consequent debasement of political discourse) by protecting its public financing
statutes with mandatory spending limits. In doing so, Vermont created a
regulatory regime that effectively serves the interest of political equality, thereby
presenting a test case through which to reevaluate that principle.
Also, the modern Supreme Court’s seminal rulings striking down wealth
discrimination in the electoral process are rooted in the principle of political
equality. In 1966, two years after the Twenty-Fourth Amendment banned poll
taxes in federal elections, the Court in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections78
77

Id. at 804-12 (White, J., dissenting); see also id. at 825-27 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
78
383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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invalidated a poll tax of $1.50 in Virginia state elections. The Court found that:
a State violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
whenever it makes the affluence of the
voter or payment of any fee an electoral
standard. Voter qualifications have no
relation to wealth . . . .79
In Bullock v. Carter,80 the Court again recognized the “real and
appreciable impact on the exercise of the franchise” which voters face under a
system that excludes them on the basis of their lack of wealth. In Bullock, the
Court struck down filing fees ranging from $150 to $8,900 that the state of
Texas required primary candidates to pay to their political parties. The Court
found that “the very size of the fees imposes under the Texas system [gave] it a
patently exclusionary character.”81 The fees violated the equal protection rights
of both voters and candidates. Prospective candidates without wealth were
precluded from seeking office, and the fees thus limited voters’ choices of
candidates and burdened less affluent voters more heavily. As the Court noted:
Many potential office seekers lacking
both personal wealth and affluent
backers are in every practical sense
precluded from seeking the nomination
of their chosen party, no matter how
qualified they might be, and no matter
how broad or enthusiastic their popular
support.82
“[W]e would ignore reality,” the Court continued, “were we not to
recognize that this system falls with unequal weight on voters, as well as
candidates, according to their economic status.”83 In Lubin v. Panish, the Court
struck down California’s $701.60 filing fee for county supervisor election, ruling
that filing fees do not “test the genuineness of a candidacy or the extent of the
voter support of an aspirant for public office.”84 “[O]ur tradition,” the Court
noted, “has been one of hospitality toward all candidates without regard to their

79

Id. at 666.
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Id. at 143.
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economic status.”85
Many have compared Buckley to the notorious, pre-New Deal case
Lochner v. New York, which relied on an idealized notion of the freedom of
contract to strike down maximum hour labor laws.86 As in Lochner, the Buckley
Court relied on idealized notions of a free marketplace of ideas to strike down
reasoned attempts to preserve basic democratic values. To persuade the Court
that it has erred, advocates must shed light upon the discontinuities between
the Court’s idealized view of politics and the reality that we have endured over
the past twenty years. Defenders of our present plutocratic electoral system
elide the substantial relationship between government enforcement of a free
market economic regime and the distribution of access to speech in the political
arena.87 Some even resort to a form of latter-day red-baiting by insisting that
reformers want government to “enter the business of redistributing both
economic and political power.”88 Aside from such deliberate misrepresentations
of the scope and effect of reform proposals, such arguments ignore the fact that
the economic inequality begets political inequality. Even if one agrees that
government should not allocate economic resources in the private realms of
property and contract, such a conclusion has no bearing on a government’s
duty to constitute itself through just electoral procedures, in which each citizen
has a meaningful opportunity to participate. Only if one assumes that money is
speech does the enforcement of political equality raise re-distributive questions.
To say that each of us enjoys the right to amass as much wealth as birth,
talent, and luck bestow is not to say that we may use that wealth to dominate the
process of democratic deliberation.
While spending limits may not necessarily render the voices of all
contestants absolutely equal, they nonetheless serve the interest of political
equality by making the prospect of political participation more realistic for a
85
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greater number of citizens. This compelling rationale alone offers ample
justification for their adoption. By broadening access to the marketplace of
ideas, spending limits not only ameliorate the present state of political inequality
but also enrich the diversity and depth of civic discourse. As set forth below in
section B, such an understanding of spending limits concords with established
First Amendment doctrine regarding the protection of key political processes
through carefully tailored regulation.
B. Money and Speech
The central obstacle to regulation of campaign spending is the Court’s
widely criticized equation of money and speech.89 The objections to this
equation are legion, and will not be rehearsed here. It suffices to note that the
Buckley decision equivocates on this very point. The Court approved
contribution limits on the theory that a contribution “serves as a general
expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not
communicate the underlying basis for support.” Hence, the “quantity of
communication does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution.”90
If money is, in fact, meaningful speech, this cannot be true: a contribution of
one dollar must mean something different from a contribution of a million.
Conversely, under the Court’s rejection of spending limits, spending ten million
dollars to repeat a television ad ten thousand times must mean something
significantly different from running that same ad one hundred times—an
extremely doubtful proposition. Clearly, the correlation between spending and
speech is not absolute. Within certain limits, spending arguably bears a high
correlation with meaningful speech (e.g., running an ad enough to achieve a
basic saturation, quantifiable as a gross market share rating); but beyond such
limits, spending takes on the attributes of conduct, as in Cincinnati, where better
financed candidates purchased all available advertising space well in advance
of the election season, effectively preventing opposition candidates to use the
medium of television themselves.
Of pressing concern to the reform advocate is the challenge of lending
empirical support to the notion that campaign spending cannot be deemed pure
speech. Any empirical data tending to rebut the alleged correspondence of
spending to ideas will bolster the argument that campaign spending is properly
understood as a form of conduct related to speech. Studies analyzing the
content (or lack thereof) as well as the effect of repetition in political advertising
could prove helpful in this regard. Such data, in turn, will allow advocates to
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urge courts to apply the more flexible First Amendment analysis applicable to
speech-related conduct outlined in United States v. O’Brien.91
In a related vein, advocates should challenge the Buckley Court’s
decision that spending limitations cannot be sustained as reasonable time,
place and manner regulations which do not discriminate among speakers or
ideas. This analysis was rejected by the Court because92 the Buckley Court
assumed that more spending must mean more speech, i.e. more substantive
contribution to issues of public concern.
A restriction on the amount of money a
person or group can spend on political
communication during a campaign
necessarily reduces the quantity of
expression by restricting the number of
issues discussed, the depth of their
exploration, and the size of the audience
reached.93
This statement, however, does not bear up well when examined under
the light of experience. Political campaigns are dominated by thirty and sixty
second television ads that contain a negligible amount of reliable information
and typically involve either oversimplified vitriol concerning the opponent’s
failings or anodyne montage associating the candidate with sunrises and smiling
babies. More critically, as Ronald Dworkin argues, repetition, the hallmark of
television ad campaigns, does not improve collective knowledge on issues of
public import.94 As Judge Skelly Wright observed, “[m]oney may register
intensities . . . but money by itself communicates no ideas.”95
The most forceful analogy in the line of cases dealing with time, place
and manner restrictions is the truck-mounted loudspeaker at issue in Kovacs.96
There, the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting the use of loud and raucous
loudspeakers to broadcast messages on city streets. While the decibel limits in
Kovacs were upheld on account of the nuisance they created, spending limits
serve a far more critical interest. The Buckley Court distinguished Kovacs and
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other time place and manner restrictions in an unconvincing manner, noting that
“expenditure limitations impose direct quantity restrictions on political
communication and association.”97 As Judge Skelly Wright observed, this
distinction is untenable, as the time, place and manner regulations can also be
seen as quantity restrictions on speech.98 In the Kovacs context, muted
loudspeakers would reach a far more limited number of citizens.
C. Reasonable Regulation of a Limited Resource: The Marketplace of Ideas
Traditional First Amendment discussions often begin by allusion to the
inviolable right of citizens to assemble in public parks to speak their minds. But
the park analogy does not reflect the reality of political communication in the
modern era. Reconciling this inexact analogy with existing system of unequal
access to the dominant media of mass communication would entail certain grim
realizations: the “park” is actually owned by (regulated) private companies who
charge a fee for those who wish to mount their soapbox. Furthermore, to the
extent that the poor may enter the “park” to speak, they may place their
soapboxes only in the marshy swamps where the public rarely strays. Their
voices fail to reach those gathered, of necessity, in the well-traveled pathways.
The din of wealthy men with bullhorns and amplifiers drowns out all hope of
effective communication with the public at large.
With these images in mind, it is incumbent on those who seek reform in
the courts to demonstrate empirically that the media used in political speech are
in fact limited. For example, in Kruse, the City of Cincinnati assembled data to
support the argument that television advertising space in city elections is subject
to a “black-out effect.”99 It is critical to note in this regard that the limited
resource in question is in fact the access to viewers and not to air time.
Theoretically, with the advent of digital transmission and cable services, there is
an immense capacity for transmitting multiple channels into households. But as
every advertising consultant knows, the critical determinant of the value of an
advertising spot is the ratings share of the program it accompanies. There are
a finite number of households with televisions and the value of a given
advertisement spot is determined by the proportional share of total households
tuned into a broadcast at a given time. Network sales agents and advertisers
rely upon the scientific quantification of viewership provided by independent
rating services like the Nielsen Service when negotiating the price of different
spots.100 Free market idealists would deny that there exist meaningful limits to
97
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communicative resources on the naïve assumption that demand for the public’s
attention will always engender new supply. This premise, however, is flatly
contradicted by the market data used in the real world to assign value to the
limited space available for televised political speech.
The Court made clear in Red Lion Broadcast. Co. v. F.C.C. that, when a
medium of communication is limited, the government cannot help but abridge
the speech rights of some to allow effective communication in that medium to
take place.101 In Red Lion, the Court unanimously upheld the FCC’s fairness
doctrine, noting that “[t]he right of free speech of a broadcaster, the user of a
sound truck, or any other individual does not embrace a right to snuff out the
free speech of others.”102 Drawing on the public’s interest in receiving a
diversity of viewpoints, the Court held that “[b]ecause of the scarcity of radio
frequencies, the Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor
of others whose views should be expressed in this unique medium.”103 Clearly,
the abridgements of free speech rights approved in Red Lion (the denial of
broadcast licenses) are more extreme and profound than those incidental to
campaign spending limitations. When the state allocates broadcast licenses to
a special minority of applicants, “the rest must be barred from the airwaves.”104
“[T]o deny a station license because ‘the public interest’ requires it ‘is not a
denial of free speech’.”105 Analogously, the question is not whether the state
can properly limit the amount of spending on campaigns, but rather how can the
state preserve the rights of all classes in society to participate in selfgovernment. If, as the Court stated in Red Lion, “the right of the public to
receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas …
may not constitutionally be abridged . . . by Congress,”106 then surely it may not
be abridged by a wealthy minority who exercises economic control over the
means of mass communication.
Antitrust law also recognizes that markets cease to function efficiently
when dominated by firms with inordinate market share. Innovation and
accountability disappear when the price of entry for new competitors becomes
too large. The Court has unequivocally established that “promoting fair
is viewership: "[w]hether cable poses a 'significant ' threat to a local broadcast market
. . . depends on whether viewers actually watch the stations that are dropped or
denied carriage." Id. Analogously, whether wealthy candidates pose a significant
threat to poor candidates depends on whether viewers actually watch the programming
alongside which poorer candidates can afford to advertise.
101
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competition is a legitimate and substantial Government goal.” 107 In Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Fed. Comm. Comm.,108 four justices concluded that
must carry provisions of the Cable Act of 1992, which undeniably burdened the
First Amendment rights of cable operators, were in part justified by the
deleterious effect that an absence of such provisions would have on the
economic survival of local broadcast stations. The Supreme Court also
reaffirmed the governmental interest of promoting the widespread dissemination
of information from a multiplicity of sources.109 In the area of elections, citizens
surely have at least an equally important interest in preserving candidates’
access to a key medium of communication to the voters during a crucial period
in the election campaign.110
The law is fond of analogy, not only for its rhetorical heft, but also for its
power of elucidation. In Buckley, the Supreme Court resorted to analogy to
justify its absolute rejection of limits on campaign expenditures, likening such
limits to a deprivation of fuel for a car: “Being free to engage in unlimited political
expression subject to a ceiling on expenditures is like being free to drive an
automobile as far and as often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline.”111
This casual metaphor deserves scrutiny, as it both reveals and obscures crucial
aspects of the present unjust system of political participation.
The misconceived car trope rests upon a host of assumptions that are
entirely in conflict with political reality. What makes our present electoral system
so tragic a violation of the constitution’s promise of equal protection is the fact
that the vast majority of Americans cannot afford a go-cart, much less a car, nor
can they pay the tolls to access the highways of public discourse. And for those
who can scrape up enough cash to ride the roads of civic debate, the political
highway is already jammed by the thundering semis and SUV’s of the wealthy.
The Court’s metaphor perhaps unintentionally concedes the two essential
features of the present political landscape: a) the limited resource of
communicative “space”; and b) the wealth barrier to entry.
As with arguments concerning political equality, advocates must address
107
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both the theoretical and empirical errors in the Court’s assumptions about
access to and competition within the marketplace of ideas. A basic tenet of the
moral justification for free markets, as identified by its proponents from Adam
Smith through Milton Friedman, is the equality of opportunity (as distinguished
from equality of outcomes). When, however, money is mistaken for speech,
relative poverty becomes a very real and quantifiable barrier to entry in civic
discourse. Once one acknowledges that ideas are the only acceptable specie
in the marketplace of ideas, one must accept equality of access to the arena of
political debate as the sine qua non of a morally justifiable constitutional system.
Advocates must marshal such arguments, armed with empirical data about the
actual operation of political speech in specific media, to persuade the Court to
abandon its staunch, formalistic opposition to campaign spending limits.
III. CONCLUSION
As the most recent decision sounding in campaign finance makes plain,
the members of the present Court share little agreement on the basic principles
at stake in proposed regulation of campaign spending.112 Members of the Court
have expressed dissatisfaction with Buckley, albeit for differing reasons, and
have suggested that the time to revisit the case approaches. Advocates of
reform should view this discord and confusion as an opportunity to proffer new
evidence and analyses that challenge the long-held misconceptions about our
political reality.
The Court has invited proponents of campaign finance reform to prove
that change is necessary. In Bellotti, the Court noted that if the case for reform
“were supported by record or legislative findings that corporate advocacy
threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes”, it would merit
consideration as a compelling interest justifying government regulation of
campaign spending. As canvassed above, the evidence is available; indeed, it
has become difficult to ignore. Reform advocates must be prepared to support
state legislatures and city councils that have the foresight to make the case for
reasonable expenditure limits and the political courage to defend such limits in
the face of court challenges. Through such efforts, we can hope that Buckley’s
conflation of money with speech will eventually join the constitutional curiosity
shop on the shelf next to poll taxes
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